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INTROCUTION
Water pollution is a global problem.' Laws that prohibit or control
pollution already exist on regional, state and even international
levels; yet tens of millions of people worldwide are without clean or
sanitary water.' For these people, water for drinking, bathing and
irrigation is dirty and disease ridden.' In addition, the rapid growth
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1. See generally THE SCARCITY OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL
AND POITIcAL RESPONSES, at 1-7 (Edward H.P. Brans et al., eds.,
Kluwer Law International 1997); see also The International Water
Law Project, at http://internationalwaterlaw.org (last visited Mar. 6,
2002) (for links to cases, books and articles on this subject).
2. See THE SCARCITY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 5-11. The
four major global problems concerning fresh water are defined as "a)
shortage of renewable supplies; b) unequal distribution of supplies;
c) problems of water quality and health; and d) disastrous effects of
unrestrained construction of dams and reservoirs." Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 7. Although clean drinking water, sanitation systems
and irrigation systems are three separate components of water law,
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rate of the earth's population is exacerbating an already serious
problem.4 However, national legislation often times may not take
into account international norms of environmental law.
Governments that are without a strong internal policy on water
pollution often implement law that is lax on pollution.'
The fact that pollution is often a transboundary occurrence
complicates global regulation of water pollution.' Water and air
pollution do not stop at territorial boundaries.7 Pollution emanating
from one nation often adversely affects the clean water in another
nation. The question of which nation has jurisdiction over the
polluter leads to animosity and fighting between the nations.9
Fighting over pollution costs has recently become an issue that the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has had to tackle.'" Various
international, political and legal bodies have offered solutions for
how to avoid interstate conflict over water pollution," yet the
problem remains unresolved and burgeoning. International
environmental law is moving toward centralization or globalization
this Note combines them into one larger problem of co-management
of shared clean water resources.
4. See George William Sherk et al., Water Wars in the Near
Future? Reconciling Competing Claims for the World's Diminishing
Freshwater Resources-the Challenge of the Next Millennium, THE
CEPMLP ONLINE J. 2, 3.1, at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/
journal/htmllarticle3-2.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
5. See, e.g., Peter Rogers, Water: Not as Cheap as You Think:
We Must Change Our Water Policies so the Cost of This Resource
Reflects its Value, 89 MASS. INST. OF TECH. REv. 30 (1986).
6. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary




10. See, e.g., Gab~fkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 35 (Sept. 25) (also printed in 37 I.L.M. 162, 202 155); see
discussion infra text Part III. Generally, ICJ cases are easily
assessable at http://www.icj-cij.org.
11. See infra note 42. For example, some of the political bodies
of the UN listed and the legal bodies of the UN, the International
Law Commission and the International Law Association. Id.
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and away from regionalization or fragmentation. 2  However,
international lawmakers are still struggling to create a regulatory
system that can be adopted by all countries universally. 3
One wonders whether the United States' Clean Water Act
("CWA")' can be used as a model of centralized regulation.15 The
United States has a long history of federal regulation of water
pollution. 6 The CWA sets out the basic rules for territorial
responsibility, causation and a standard of care. 7 However, in order
to be a successful model, the CWA must be a successful program.
Further, the CWA must be transferable and translatable to the
international community. This quest is problematic because although
the U.S. court system has validated the CWA, the Act has not proven
to be an effective vehicle for protecting the polluted state. 8 Because
there is no consistent body of decisional law in the U.S. concerning
the CWA, one cannot be certain whether the law governing
transboundary pollution in the U.S. is, in actuality, more developed
than that in the international community and, hence, used as a
blueprint for international water pollution control.' 9
This Note examines whether the CWA can be used as a model of
centralized regulation of transboundary pollution for the
international community or whether the federal system is as flawed
as the current international environmental legal regime. Part I gives
an overview of the international norms and standards regarding
trans-boundary pollution by examining several of the international
12. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 931.
13. See discussion infra text Part I. Many of the international
documents that create a model regulatory regime contain exceptions
for those countries that do not have the economic or social means to
begin a program banning pollution and punishing polluters.
14. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 6, at 933.
16. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Actions Brought Under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Acts Amendments of 1972 (Clean
Water Act) (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et. seq.)-Supreme Court Cases,
163 A.L.R. FED. 531, § 2(a) (2000).
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legal and political bodies that have been established in response to
global water scarcity, and their weaknesses. Evident in these
documents is the lack of monitoring and enforcement measures. Part
II introduces background to the CWA, focusing on its treatment of
transboundary pollution. Part II examines the 1997 United Nations
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses and the Danube Dam Case, comparing these two new
developments in international transboundary pollution to the CWA.
Part III discusses the way North America has managed its
international transboundary water resource conflicts and looks at the
most recent of international water management agreements. Part IV
returns to the CWA to answer the question of whether the future of
clean global water depends on an existing example of centralized
water management.
I. THE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF BILATERAL TREATIES,
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
As previously stated, international environmental regulation is
changing from a fragmented or regional approach to a global or
centralized approach. Does this change mean success in controlling
transboundary pollution? More than 200 multilateral agreements
("MEAs")2  exist to deal with environmental issues. However, few
MEAs deal directly with transboundary pollution.2' Many bilateral
treaties and agreements exist between nations sharing waterways, 22
but these treaties go largely unnoticed until an international dispute
between parties to the agreement arises. A number of international
20. One source puts this number at 216 and growing. See WTO,
WTO REPORT: THE NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
(1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envire/
stud99_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
21. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 933.
22. See, e.g., Jesse H. Hamner & Aaron T. Wolf, Patterns in
International Water Resource Treaties: The Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database, 1997 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 157 (1997) (analyzing the 124 bilateral treaties governing the
world's international watersheds negotiated since 1870).
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water law conferences have been held, creating conventions and
declarations;23 yet these non-binding instruments merely propose
governing principles and have little to do with liability and pollution
limitations.2 4
A. Water Scarcity and Unilateral Solutions
Seventy percent of the world's surface is covered by water.25
Ninety-seven percent of the total water supply is ocean water, and
2.5% of the remaining water supply is fresh water. 6 Further, as
much of this fresh water supply is trapped in polar caps and glaciers,
only an estimated 0.36% of the world's water can be used as a fresh
27water resource. If the water supply were to remain at its present
level and was evenly distributed, the fresh water supply would be
enough for the world population. 28 However, while many of the
,-developed countries have an abundance of fresh water, and have the
economies and resources to keep it fresh and clean,29 developing
countries, who might not have enough fresh water to begin with, are
faced with choosing between controlling water pollution or ensuring
food availability and economic development.3"
Developing countries often rely on industrialization to increase
their economic growth.3  Although industrialization causes
pollution, the importance of a sustained economy is often seen to be
of higher value to the developing countries than regulation and
protection of the water supply.3 2 Other economic development, such
23. See The International Water Law Project, supra note 1 (for a
list of conferences, agendas and papers).
24. See generally Hamner & Wolf, supra note 22, at 158
(analyzing the content of international multilateral and bilateral
treaties and agreements dealing with non-navigational uses of
water).
25. THE SCARCITY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Sherk et al., supra note 4, at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.2, 2.3.
31. Id. at 2.1.
32. Id. at 2.3.
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as the building of dams of hydroelectric water plants, is another
attempt to strengthen national economies.33 Such development not
only comes at the expense of safe water supplies but also increases
the threat of ecological disasters.34 Conservation is further stressed
by a rapidly growing world population,35 which places additional
strain on existing clean water supplies.36 Finally, agriculture
consumes most of the available water- supply, and agricultural
policy, like industrial policy, often favors use, not conservation of
the water supply.37
For nations whose fresh water supply is shared by another nation,
bilateral treaties are the most common manner in which to set the
rules and policies for each nation's use of such water.3" These
treaties also apportion amounts of water for each nation depending
on which is the upstream state and which is the downstream state.39
In places where there is conflict, either a joint commission or the ICJ
may administer arbitration.4 Conflict often occurs because instead
of treaties being examined and re-drafted with the changing needs of
the nations and new knowledge. regarding environmental pollution
33. Id.
34. See Sherk et al., supra note 4, at 2.3.
35. See id. at 3.1. The statistics on population growth is that, over
the past 40 years, the population size has more than doubled to its
present size of approximately 6 billion. It is projected that by 2100
the population will increase to around 12 billion. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2.2.
38. Merrill, supra note 6, at 932.
39. See THE SCARCrrY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 12 (using as
examples of bilateral treaties addressing transboundary water
conflict: The Nile River Treaty System; article 6 of the Israeli-Arab
water conflict; Israel-Jordan 1994 Treaty of Peace, article 6; 1987
Agreement on the Common Zambezi River System); see also Sherk
et al., supra note 4, at 5.2-5.4 (for examples of the Indus River, the
Meuse River and the Mekong River as shared waterways subject to
treaty and conflict resolution).
40. See supra Sherk et al., note 4, at 5.2-5.4 (examples include
the Mekong River Commission, the Permanent Joint Technical
Committee between Egypt and Sudan, and the Joint Water
Committee between Israel and Jordan).
DIRTYLAUNDRY
addressed, the treaties are simply ignored until the pollution of one
state environmentally threatens its neighbor.4'
B. Water Scarcity: International Response
1. The Early Declarations and Customary International Law
Despite the prevalence of bilateral treaties, various international
organizations under the umbrella of the United Nations have
attempted to create universal norms and principles of water
management. 2 The United Nations ("U.N.") was prompted to act by
fear of upstream states strong-arming downstream states into
unfavorable treaties, as well as by the developing countries favoring
their own economic needs over the global necessity to control
pollution. Two of the earliest and perhaps best-known statements
concerning international trans-boundary pollution are Principle 21 of
the Stockholm Declaration43 and Article 10 of the Helsinki Rules."
41. See Hamner & Wolf, supra note 22, at 160 (citing as an
example, the Jordan Basin). In this region, an unratified bilateral
treaty led to unilateral development and eventually conflict which
escalated to war in the early 1950's and mid-1960's. Id.
42. Although the history of U.N. organizations, conventions,
declarations and agreements which deal with water problems is too
voluminous for this paper, some of these organizations which
tackled the water problem include: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Development
Program, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, United Nations Environment Program, United Nations
Children's Fund, United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, World Health Organization ("WHO"), World
Meteorological Organization and United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development.
43. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, princ. 21 (produced in Stockholm from June 5-16,
1972), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?
DocumentlD=97&ArticlelD=1503 (last visited Mar. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
44. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International
Rivers, art. 10 (adopted by the International Law Association at the
2001]
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Principle 21 states that all nations "have the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."45  Likewise, the Helsinki Rules
provide that a nation must prevent new or increased water pollution
that would cause "substantial injury" in a co-basin nation.46
Although these documents are not binding on the nations that have
ratified them, the principles have since become customary
international law, recognized by most nations as generally accepted
principles of law.4 Through principles such as these, international
law has been able to limit the absolute territorial sovereignty of
nations.
The first convention to build upon the principles of the Stockholm
Declaration was the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development ("UNCED"), which met in Rio de Janeiro in June of
1992 ("Rio Declaration").48 Seeking to both affirm and build upon
the principles of the Stockholm Declaration, the participating states
fifty-second conference, held at Helsinki in August 1966), available
at http://www.inter nationalwaterlaw.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002)
(photocopy on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Journal)
[hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
45. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 43, at princ. 21.
46. Helsinki Rules, supra note 44, at art. 10.
47. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 952-53.
48. U.N. ENv'T PROGRAMME, Rio DECLARATION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26, U.N.
Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1992), available at http://www.uneporg/
Documents/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD= 1163 (last
visited Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Rio DECLARATION].
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adopted Agenda 21,'9 an action program to guide governments in
implementing national environmental legislation.5 °
Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 deals specifically with the issue of water
scarcity.5 The general objective of Chapter 18 objective is "to make
certain that adequate supplies of water of. good quality are
maintained for the entire population of this planet, while preserving
the hydrological, biological and chemical functions of ecosystems,
adapting human activities within the capacity limits of nature and
combating vectors of water-related diseases."52 Chapter 18 then lists
seven proposed program areas for safeguarding global water
resources from pollution.53 Each proposed program area identifies a
set of objectives and activities to be carried out in the
implementation of such program.
5 4
49. Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater
Resources: Application of Integrated Approaches to the
Development, Management and Use of Water Resources, U.N.
Environment Programme, Agenda Item 21, ch. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/26 (1992), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents
/Default.asp?Document ID=52&ArticlelD=66 (last visited Mar. 6,
2002) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
50. See RIO DECLARATION, supra note 48. The Rio Declaration,
including Agenda 21, is not binding nor self-executing. It is a
guideline with an ambitious objective. State governments, in order
to implement Agenda 21, must take the principles or programs and
adopt them as local law. Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration states,
"States shall enact effective environmental legislation." Id. at princ.
11.
51. See generally Agenda 21, supra note 49, at ch. 18.
52. Id. at ch. 18.2.
53. Id. at ch. 18.5. The seven programme areas are: "a) integrated
water resources development and management; b) water resources
assessment; c) protection of water resources, water quality and
aquatic ecosystems; d) drinking-water supply and sanitation; e)
water and sustainable urban development; f) water for sustainable
food production and rural development; g) impacts of climate
change on water resources." Id.
54. For example, the objectives for integrated water resources
development and management ("Programme A") are:
2001]
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In addition to being all encompassing,55 Chapter 18 declares the
development of an institutional mechanism to carry out the nations
water policy as an objective without being explicit regarding what
the water policy should be and how to develop the institutional
mechanisms to carry it out.56 For example, Chapter 18.12 refers
a) To promote a dynamic, interactive, iterative and
multisectoral approach to water resources management
b) To plan for the sustainable and rational utilization,
protection, conservation and management of water
resources based on community needs within the
framework of national economic development policy;
c) To design, implement and evaluate projects and
programmes . . . based on an approach of full public
participation ....
d) To identify and strengthen or develop . . . the
appropriate institutional, legal and financial mechanism
to ensure that water policy and its implementation are a
catalyst for sustainable social progress and economic
growth.
Id. at ch. 18.9. The activities for Programme A include: "h)
[m]obilization of water resources, particularly in arid and semi-arid
areas; 1) [p]romotion of water conservation through improved water-
use efficiency and wastage minimization schemes for all users,
including development of water-saving devices; o) [d]evelopment
and strengthening, as appropriate, of cooperation, including
mechanisms where appropriate, at all levels concerned . . . ." Id. at
ch. 18.12.
55. Chapter 18 attempts to address all the clean water concerns,
including urban and rural, industrial and agricultural, developed and
developing countries, sanitation, technology, social policy,
minorities, economic strain and level of responsibility. It provides a
good guideline for the direction development of environmental
programs and for an assessment of goals, but it does not suggest a
nation can actually attain such lofty goals. See id. at ch. 18.
56. Chapter 18.27 provides for all States to undertake an
institutional framework, and determine what that institutional
framework should do. At the same time, Agenda 21 does not provide
how such framework should be formed or what liabilities or
DIRTYLAUNDRY
specifically to action from the global level down to the lowest
level. 7 This requires specific planning, management, delegation and
harmonization to occur at every level. 8 However, the control of
water policy at a local or regional level is completely different than
at the national level-one approach is regionalized and the other is
centralized. By including both options in the same sentence, Chapter
18 creates an action program that fails to determine which level of
government is responsible for taking such action. Thus, far from
creating an action plan, Agenda 21 simply reinforces the broad-
based recommendations of policy made at Stockholm.
2. The World Trade Organization
Other than the 20 specialized agencies of the United Nations, no
global international organization, such as the World Trade
minimum limitations on pollution for which it should provide. See
id. at ch. 18.27.
57. Chapter 18 distinguishes that:
(i) At the lowest appropriate level, delegation of water
resources management, generally, to that level, in
accordance with national legislation, including
decentralization of government services to local
authorities, private enterprises and communities;
(ii) At the national level, integrated water resources
planning and management in the framework of the
national planning process and, where appropriate,
establishment of independent regulation and monitoring
of freshwater, based on national legislation and economic
measures;
(iii) At the regional level, consideration, where
appropriate, of the harmonization of national strategies
and action programmes;
(iv) At the global level, improved delineation of
responsibilities, division of labour and coordination of
international organizations and programmes, including
facilitation discussions and sharing experience in areas
related to water resources management.
Agenda 21, supra note 49, at ch. 18.12(o).
58. Id.
2001]
176 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. XIII
Organization ("WTO") has addressed the problem of a diminishing
and dirty transboundary water supply. 9  The WTO is strictly
concerned with the international trade in goods. Water is not
currently thought of as a tradable good, but what if it was? One can
imagine if water does become a tradable commodity, the WTO
would regulate such trade.
The WTO came into effect for all member nations on January 1,
1995.60 Agreements that govern the WTO include the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), as amended,6 as well as
numerous side agreements dealing with specific areas of trade.6" The
59. The World Bank is an organization that funds many
developing nations in an attempt to solve their water crises, but it too
falls under the U.N. umbrella. The organizations list, supra note 42
and all the conventions and declarations listed in the Protocol, infra
text Part III, also fall under the U.N. umbrella. I except this of any
of the charters of regional economic integrations, such as the
European Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations, or the
North American Free Trade Association because they necessarily
exclude truly global interests and problems.
60. The present set up of the WTO was concluded in 1994 at the
end of the last of the Round negotiations, the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Final Act, incorporating the
GATT and the side agreements, was also finalized in 1994, but all
agreements as well as the WTO itself entered into force as of Jan. 1,
1995. There are over one hundred governments who are members of
the WTO.
61. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. When this Note refers to
GATT, it refers only to the amended GATT of 1994.
62. See,. e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 28 (1994) [hereinafter
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closest the WTO comes to dealing witlP'6nvironmental issues is in
Article XX, which are the general exceptions of GATT,63 and the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS Agreement").64
The water regulation issue has never come up as a matter of
dispute among WTO member nations.65 However, it is possible that
Agriculture Agreement]; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
28 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
63. The environmental exceptions listed in Art. XX may be found
at XX(b) and (g). The chapeau to Art. XX states that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
XX (b):necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health; and
XX(g): relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.
Final Act, supra note 61, at arts. XX, XX(b), XX(g).
64. The SPS Agreement is an elaboration of the rules of GATT
XX(b), and includes "any sanitary or phytosanitary measures
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health.
." SPS Agreement, supra note 62, at art. 2(1).
65. Under both the GATT and then the WTO, there have been
only eight environmental panel proceedings under the dispute
mechanism since 1948. All measures involved the GATT Article XX
exceptions. They included: Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and
Tuna Products (Can. v. U.S.) (1982); Measures Affecting Exports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Can. v. U.S.) (1988); Restrictions
on the Importation of and Internal taxes on Cigarettes (U.S. v.
Thail.) (1990); Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mex. v. U.S.)
20011
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a national measure relating to water use, production or consumption
that causes a restraint on trade may violate either Articles XX(b) or
XX(g) of GATT or the SPS Agreement.66 Additionally, certain
water related technology might be protected by patent law and,
therefore, fall under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ('TRIPS"). 67 Thus, the existence of the
WTO may already indirectly affect transboundary water law.
What if water became a product for export? If water became an
expendable commodity to developed, water-rich countries and a
cheap but necessary commodity for water-scarce countries to buy,6"
(1991); Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (European Union v. U.S.)
(1994); Taxes on Automobiles (European Union v. U.S.) (1994);
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Venez. &
Braz. v. U.S.) (1996); Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (India, Malay., Pak. & Thail. v. U.S.) (1998). In
addition,. European Community Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Can. & U.S. v. European Union) (1998), involved
the SPS Agreement. See Environmental Disputes in GATT/WTO
(providing links to panel proceedings involving the examination of
environmental measures or human health-related measures under
GATT Article 20), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
envir__e/edis00_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Beef
Hormones case].
66. For example, a measure which prohibits the import of certain
products which may have the effect of de-purifying water, if
disposed of incorrectly, may be argued as being trade restrictive, but
may be justified as necessary for the protection of human health or
life, particularly if such measure is advocated or supported by the
Protocol.
67. Water safety technology, testing equipment, etc. may have
intellectual property rights and therefore be governed under the
TRIPS. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 62.
68. It is suggested that this proposition is already occurring, and
may in fact be a more efficient means of water allocation in poor
water countries, than the more expensive means of creating and
maintaining a system to prevent and monitor water pollution. See
THE ScARcrrY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 106 (quoting M. Thobani,
Tradable Property Rights to Water, World Bank Paper (1995)).
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it would be governed either by GATT as a product/good or by
TRIPS as a property right.69
Although the WTO has not directly addressed the question of
regulating the global water supply, it has formed the Committee on
Trade and Environment ("CTE"). The CTE has recently completed
a special study on Trade and Environment" and has recommended
that the WTO not tackle these issues.7 According to the CTE, the
WTO's most influential role in serving environmental needs would
be as a model of international cooperation upholding all legal rights
and obligations.72  The WTO's reluctance to take on an
environmental agenda suggests that it will not likely replace the U.N.
as a forum for the resolution of environmental and transboundary
disputes between nations.73
69. Id.; see also id. at 253 (for the proposition that if water
becomes a tradable good under GATT, it would be subject to the
same provisions on tariffs and export restrictions. Provisions
restricting the amount of water leaving or entering a State could
come under Article XI of GATT).
70. The CTE is used as a forum for WTO Members to discuss
environmental issues and was set up by the 1994 Ministerial
Decision on Trade and Environment. The Trade and Environment
study, released in October 1999 mainly discusses the relation of
MEAs to the CTE. The conclusion is that the best way to deal with
international environmental problems is via MEAs, not the WTO.
See Work of the Trade and Environment Committee, at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min99_e/english/about_e/13envi
_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
71. See id. "The WTO is not an environmental agency. Its
members do not want it to intervene in national or international
environmental policies or set environmental standards. Other
agencies that specialize in environmental issues are better qualified
to undertake those tasks." Id.
72. Id.
73. See THE ScARcrrY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 109.
The crucial question is whether unilateral measures of
governments to protect the trade in fresh water in the
context of the right to an adequate standard should be
considered as not 'necessary,' taking into account
GATT's preference for international agreements; Practice
2001]
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II. A COMPARATIVE REGIME
To view the U.N. as filling the need for an international manager
of the environment is clearly an exercise in futility. The U.N.
monitors environmental threats, fosters cooperation among nations,
provides financial assistance and sets forth goals for the nations to
meet.74 But there is not one organization that is directly responsible
for enforcing implementation of national environmental programs,
arbitrating conflicts among nations or even collecting information on
the successes or failures of the national programs.75 In particular,
neither the documents of the U.N. dealing with water pollution nor
the WTO agreements offer any insight regarding how to translate
soft law into hard law.
A. The Clean Water Act-A Brief Overview
One example of a hard law concerning water management is the
United States Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA addresses the
problems and difficulties facing an organization attempting to
structure a centralized program of water law. Thus one can
anticipate the problems of international regulation of water by
comparing the CWA to the current international structures in place.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (or CWA) was enacted in
1948 with the aim of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."76 The Act
sets up a structure by which both the states and the federal
government maintain their sovereign power in certain defined
has shown that the former GATT panels dealing with
disputes between states regarding the interpretation of the
general exception clause did not take recommendations of
the U.N. specialized agencies into account if they did not
fit into the protection of freedom of international trade.
Id.
74. See Catherine Tinker, Environmental Planet Management by
the United Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come?, 22
N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL., 793, 798-99 (1990).
75. Id. at 805.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1995).
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areas.77 Specifically, each state may establish its own systems of
water management, including setting pollution limitations, provided
that they at least meet the minimum standards set forth by the federal
government.7" The federal agency responsible for setting these
minimum standards and for overseeing the states' actions is the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 79
The CWA takes two approaches to protect water from pollutants:
effluent limitations"° and water quality standards.8' Although the
basic premise is that pollution is illegal82 there are exceptions to this
rule.83 One such exception is the provision to allow effluents, which
are pollutants, to enter a body of water." An effluent limitation is a
restriction on quantities, rates and concentrations of effluents. 5
Effluent limitations may be set either by the states or by the
Administrator. 6 States can adopt limitations that are stricter than the
77. Leonard B. Dworsky et al., Water Resources Planning and
Management in the United States Federal System: Long Term
Assessment and Intergovernmental Issues, 31 NAT. RES. J. 475, 525
(1991).
78. Id.
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).
80. See id. § 1311.
81. Id. § 1313.
82. Id. § 1311(a). "Except as in compliance with this section and
sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." Id.
83. Id. (Sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342 and 1344 set out
these exceptions).
84. See id. § 1362(6).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
86. See id. § 1370.
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in
this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any
State . . . to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution;
except that if an effluent limitation ... is in effect under
this chapter, such State . . . not adopt or enforce any
effluent limitation . . . which is less stringent than the
effluent limitation ... under this chapter.
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federal standards, however, state limitations cannot be lower than the
federal limitations.87 State limits on effluents must be approved by
the EPA and are subject to review by the proper authority.88
States also set their own water quality standards. 89  These
standards, approved by the EPA, are then maintained and enforced
by each state for its own waters.9" The EPA Administrator proposes
water quality standards for any state that does not set its own
standards.9 The criteria used for water quality are based on
standards necessary to protect public health, as well as fish and
wildlife and recreational activities involving the particular navigable
water.92
The system of maintaining effluent limitations and water quality
standards is administered through the National Pollutant Discharge
Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. § 1313(b)(2)(A) "Whenever the State revises or
adopts a new standard, such revised or new standard shall be
submitted to the Administrator." Id. § 1313(b)(3). "If the
Administrator . . . determines that such standard meets the
requirements of this chapter, such standard shall thereafter be the
water quality standard of that State." Id. Such review of standards
by the Governor of the State or the State water pollution control
agency takes place at least once every three years via public
hearings.
89. The 1998 Idaho Water Quality Symposium, 35 IDAHO L. REv.
453, 466 (1999). Generally, the States set water quality standards
while effluent limitations are technology-based minimum standards
set by the EPA. Water quality standards must be based on
(1) the 'designated uses' of the waters, such as for
fishing, swimming, drinking, or protection of aquatic life;
(2) 'water quality criteria' necessary to protect such uses,
that may be expressed in narrative form, numeric criteria,
or both; and (3) an 'anti-degradation' requirement,




91. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b)(1) (1994).
92. Id. § 1312(a).
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Elimination System ("NPDES").93 The NPDES is a permit issued by
the EPA Administrator, after a public hearing, for the discharge of
any pollutant. Before issuing a permit, the Administrator determines
whether the polluter will meet the requirements under the Act or any
such other requirements the Administrator deems necessary.94 States
are authorized to administer such a permit program for discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters within its jurisdiction.95 However,
no permit will be issued if the Administrator objects. 96
Additionally, the Administrator can withhold approval of any state
permit program that does not ensure compliance with the
requirements of the Act.97
None of the international documents addressing clean water
resources provide for an administering body such as the EPA or a
clear and established pollution controlling system such as the
NPDES system. At the same time, the CWA takes into account the
need for state sovereignty, albeit a limited sovereignty. Limitations
of the CWA are set forth in Part III.B, and include an apparent
preference for the rights of a source state over those of an affected
state and preventing states from overriding an Administrator's
decision.
B. North America's International Water Management System
In addition to its own water management, the United States is
involved in the international management of its shared water
resources with Mexico and Canada. Each of these nations has its
own national clean water regulations, but they submit their disputes
over boundary waters to the International Commissions that govern
them.98  The United States, Mexico and Canada have two
international commissions to regulate and manage the water that
93. Id. § 1342(a)(1).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 1342 (a)(5).
96. Id.
97. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(5).
98. See generally Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton,
Assessing North America's Management of its Transboundary
Waters, 33 NAT. RES. J. 413 (1993).
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these nations share. 99  The International Joint Commission
(U.S./Canada) and the International Boundary and Water
Commission (U.S./Mexico) reconcile water disputes over their
international boundary waters via dispute resolution."
Besides administering treaties for the Colorado, Rio Grande and
Tijuana Rivers, the commissions have recently faced new challenges
in transboundary management.'' Such problems include the
negative effects of acid rain, irrigation and sewage problems, and
power plant discharges.0" Additional concerns such as protection of
biodiversity, a growing policy movement towards ecological
management, and an increase in bilateral trade agreements force the
commissions to tackle and solve a variety of water management
issues."3 The successes, failures and challenges that face these two
commissions would be the same as those that face any commission
that both manages international resources and resolves international
conflicts.
An obvious failure of the kind of international water management
system, such as the IJC and the IBWL is that the governments of the
nations involved refuse to acknowledge or implement the
agreements and standards set by the commissions.0 4 The IJC is
governed by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, which provides
certain mechanisms and principles for the Commission to follow in
99. Id. at 413-14. The International Joint Commission ("IJC")
reconciles disputes between the U.S. and Canada while the
International Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC") reconciles
disputes between the U.S. and Mexico. Although they have mainly
been limited bodies to reconcile disputes, recently a conference was
held to assess how the Commissions and the three governments
could work together to share resources, cooperate and avoid
international conflict. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 415.
102. Id. at 416.
103. Id. at 415.
104. See generally Dworsky & Utton, supra note 98 at 420-21.
Neither the U.S. nor Canada have implemented Water Quality
Agreements promulgated by the IJC and have failed to use water
quality standards geared towards the restoration of the Great Lakes.
See id.
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the prevention and resolution of disputes between U.S. and Canadian
shared water." 5 Although the IJC is succeeding in setting water
levels and water allocations, it has underused its powers to enforce
water quality."0 6 Both Canada and the U.S. should allow the
Commission to exert bi-national control over water quality
standards, 0 7 as the U.S. government has done in exerting federal
control over water pollution between its states.
In order for these international commissions to be successful, the
three governments of the U.S., Canada and Mexico must create the
authorities or institutions actually needed to implement and enforce
the principles and guidelines of the commissions, while further
making implementation of an international water program a
priority.0 8 The IJC, for example, has the authority to conduct
hearings, make findings, suggest policy objectives and set forth
guidelines,0 9 but these results are all ineffective if not signed into
law by both the United States and Canada. Similar to the existing
international conventions on clean water, the commissions cannot
work without recognition and implementation by the national
governments of the legitimacy of international standards and control
mechanisms.
III. THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
The international community has recently re-examined the
problem of water control. One can argue that the international
initiatives have taken into account both the success and the failures
of the CWA. In 1997, there were two major developments in
105. Id. at 420.
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id. at 427. The U.S. government established not only
statutory principles, goals and standards, but also created a
governmental authority, the EPA, to oversee and manage the federal,
state and local enforcement of the statute. See id.
108. Id. at 426.
109. Id. at 428 n.30 (stating that Article X of the 1909 Boundary
Water Treaty authorizes the dispute finding and recommendation
authority of the IJC).
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international clean water management. The first development
occurred when the first environmental case went before the ICJ. This
case involved a transboundary water conflict between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia."' The second development was the general
acceptance of a new international convention governing the uses of
transboundary water resources."' The international community has
hailed this new convention as the answer to the inherent conflict
between sovereign national water management and international
water management. The combination of these two developments
indicated that the world may be ready for a change in the status quo
regarding transboundary water quality.
A. The Danube Dam Case
In 1997 the ICJ ruled on its first environmental treaty dispute
case." Although the case concerned a dispute over a bi-lateral
treaty, it highlighted the problem of inadequate international
cooperation on environmental issues. The leaders of Hungary and
the (former) Czechoslovak Republic signed a treaty in 1977 for the
construction and operation of the Gab~fkovo-Nagymaros System of
Locks." 3 The project included two hydroelectric power plants and
the building of a dam and canal through which to divert water."4
The idea was to produce hydroelectricity while protecting against
flooding."5 The two countries had agreed to share the financing,
construction and management of the project." 6 Each party would
110. See discussion infra Part III.A.
111. See discussion infra Part III.B.
112. See Colleen P. Graffy, Water, Water Everywhere, Nor Any
Drop to Drink: The Urgency of Transnational Solutions to
International Riparian Disputes, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 399,
432 (1998); see also S. Stec & G.E. Eckstein, Of Solemn Oaths and
Obligations: The Environmental Impact of the ICJ's Decision in the
Case Concerning the Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 Y.B. OF
INT'L. ENVTL. L. 41 (1998).





contribute to the project, and both would equally reap the benefits." 7
The 1977 Treaty set out guidelines for preserving the quality of
water prior to the project."'
The dispute between the two parties arose in 1989 when Hungary
abandoned the project, citing negative environmental risks caused by
the project."9 Czechoslovakia elected to continue with the project,
creating a dam in its own territory and under its own control.' 20
Czechoslovakia's dam was known as "Variant C.'' In May of
1992, Hungary formally terminated the 1977 Treaty itself.'22 This
act led to the parties submitting their dispute to the ICJ in June
1993. t23 In making its decision, the Court relied on the 1977 Treaty
and principles of customary public international law. 2 1
The Danube Dam case indicated the first time an esteemed
international high court had an opportunity to make rulings on
principles and to set precedent that would guide international
environmental law. 2  The Court first found that Hungary did not
have a right to suspend and abandon the project, 26 nor to walk away
from the 1977 Treaty.2 7  Second, the Court found that
117. Id.
118. Id. at 432-33.
119. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 433.
120. Id.; see also Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein,
International Water Law, Groundwater Resources and the Danube
Dam Case, in GAMBUNG WITH GROUNDWATER-PHYSICAL,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF AQUIFER-STREAM
RELATIONS, 243, 245 (John Van Brahana et al., eds., 1998).
121. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 433; see also Eckstein &
Epstein, supra note 120, at 243.
122. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 433.
123. Id. at 434.
124. Id. at 436.
125. See Stec & Eckstein, supra note 112, at 49.
126. "The Court ... [flinds... that Hungary was not entitled to
suspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989, the works on the
Nagymaros Project on the part of the Gab~ikovo Project for which
the Treaty of 16 September 1977 and related instruments attributed
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Czechoslovakia had the right to proceed with what was considered a
"provisional"' 8 solution.'29 The main point of contention among the
justices was that Hungary had not conclusively supported its fear of
risk of a grave and imminent peril. 3 ' In choosing not to weigh the
scientific evidence of both sides, but instead using customary
international law, the court concluded that Hungary's threats did not
amount to a grave and imminent peril. 3'
Reaching its decision, the Court chose not to make any decisive
statements about environmental law, 32 finding only that Hungary
had prematurely terminated the Treaty.'33 Hungary could have
simply incorporated its environmental concerns into the original
Treaty, by amendment, through articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 1977
128. Czechoslovakia itself considered Variant C provisional
because it was a temporary measure and had been conducted within
the framework of the 1977 Treaty. See id. at 46.
129. Id. at 79. The Court found "that Czechoslovakia was entitled
to proceed, in November 1991, to the 'provisional solution' as
described in the terms of the Special Agreement." Id. There was
some discussion that Variant C was a unilateral provisional solution
in violation of international law, yet because it had not been put into
operation, Czechoslovakia was entitled to continue with its
construction. See, e.g., Stec & Eckstein, supra note 112, at 44.
130. See Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 120, at 243; see also
Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 10, at 37. In following
the International Law Commission's Article 33 of the Draft Articles
on the International Responsibility of States and customary
international law, the Court, in the words of the Draft Articles,
concluded that there must have been an "essential interest" of the
State to act in conflict with its international obligations, and that
such interest must be threatened by a "grave and imminent peril."
Id.
131. See Gabefkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 10, at 37.
132. Id. at 38. The Court supplemented its finding that Hungary
had not proved imminent peril by first stating that it has stresses,
"the great significance that it attaches to respect for the environment,
not only for States, but also for the whole of mankind." Id.
133. Id. at 63.
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Treaty. ' These articles were included to allow the parties to
accommodate new states of environmental knowledge.
The articles do not contain specific obligations of
performance but require the parties, in carrying out their
obligations to ensure that the quality of water in the Danube
is not impaired and that nature is protected, to take new
environmental norms into consideration when agreeing upon
the means to be specified in the Joint Contractual Plan. 3 '
The Court continues by saying that implementation of new norms
must be a mutual arrangement translating into specific obligations.'13 6
Additionally, the notice of termination Hungary gave to
Czechoslovakia was ineffective in and of itself to terminate the
Treaty.'37 Due to this inadequacy of termination, both parties were
still under legal obligation to continue to negotiate the terms of the
Treaty in good faith, taking environmental impacts into
consideration. 3 '
Although the Court chose to look at this case not as an
environmental dispute but rather as a treaty dispute, some
commentators feel the Court went far enough in supporting
international environmental law and that the ruling marks a turning
134. Id. at 64.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 120, at 245-46.
138. See Gab~fkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 10, at 75. The
Court stresses that new environmental norms and standards should
be taken into consideration even when continuing with activities
already begun.
It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final
result of these negotiations to be conducted by the
Parties. It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed
solution that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty,
which must be pursued in a joint and integrated way, as
well as the norms of international environmental law and
the principles of the law of international watercourses.
Id. The Court had previously mentioned the recent adoption of the
1997 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses.
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point in international environmental awareness.'39 Conversely, some
critics argue that the Court's refusal to consider the real scientific
evidence put before it of the risk of environmental harm was a
setback for international environmental law. 4 ' However, because
the ruling came from the ICJ, it seems clear that other courts will
look to this decision when deciding issues of international
environmental law, and particularly transboundary watercourse
use.
14 1
B. The International Law Commission's Convention on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
In the Danube Dam Case, the Court not only mentioned, but also
directly quoted from, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-
139. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 439 (concluding that the Court
reinforced the view that international water boundaries must be a
source of unity, that non traditional tools such as the precautionary
principle, sustainable development and environmental rights can be
used in environmental impact assessment, and encouraged State
cooperation of the 1997 Convention). "The [Gabeikovo-
Nagymaros] Case can be viewed as a barometer of humanity's
growing environmental awareness. By demonstrating the balance
which must be maintained lietween pursuing economic projects and
preserving the quality of the environment, it signifies a turning point
and indicates just how far we have come." Id. at 439.
140. Compare Graffy, supra note 112, at 440, with Stec &
Eckstein, supra note 112, at 41, and Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note
120, at 247 (arguing that the decision failed to give recognition to
the changing international norms relating to sustainable development
by neglecting to apply the international law on the use of shared
watercourses and by avoiding scientific justification for the Court's
conclusions). On the scientific evidence point, Gabriel and Yoram
Eckstein wrote, "[t]here is presently an absence of scientific
knowledge among government Officials, legislators, policy-makers,
jurists and legal scholars. This situation often results in significant
problems of inadequate protection, mismanagement, and certainly
damage to natural resources ad the environment." Eckstein &
Eckstein, supra, at 246-47.
141. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note, at 246-47.
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Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which had just
been adopted in April of 1997 ("1997 Convention"). In doing so,
the Court reminded the parties that they must communicate with
each other in order to adhere to the principle of using, managing and
sharing the watercourse in an "equitable and reasonable manner"."'
This principle is the cornerstone of the 1997 Convention."' The
basis of this principle is that all states have a sovereign right to use
the water in its own territory as it sees fit.'45 In an international
context, riparian states have equal rights to use shared water. 46 It
becomes necessary to use equity and reason as the principles to
142. The Court quoted from Article 5, paragraph 2, for the
proposition that States must adhere to the principle of equitable and
reasonable manner for use of shared international watercourse. See
Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 10, at 77. "Watercourse
States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner."
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 2nd
Sess., art. 5, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/51/869 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
Convention]. This document is also assesable at http://www.dundee.
ac.uk/cepmlp/water/assets/images/UNCONV.doc.
143. 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at art. 5, para.1. Article 5,
paragraph 1 states:
Watercourse States shall, in their respective territories
utilize and international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner. In particular, an international
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse
States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into
account the interests of the Watercourse States
concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the
watercourse.
Id. at art. 5, para. 1.




192 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [VOL. XIII
temper implementation of such sovereign rights,'47 otherwise conflict
and/or a reduction in the quality or quantity of water will ensue. 4 '
Similar to the Convention on the Law of the Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, the CWA also demands tempered
execution of state sovereignty. However, U.S. courts support the
need to allow the EPA Administrator discretion in how the water
pollution laws are interpreted and implemented.'49 When the need
arises, the federal government can take matters out of the hands of
the state and force administration on a federal level. 5' The U.S.
Supreme Court, in the case of International Paper Company (IPC) v.
Ouellette,5' was asked to answer the question of whether the CWA
pre-empted a common law nuisance suit, which is filed under the
law of an "affected" state, when the source of the injury is another
state. '5 The court ruled that the CWA pre-empts an affected state
from being able to stop the issuance of a permit allowing a source
state to discharge pollutants that would affect the quality of the water
in another state. 53
According to the Supreme Court in Ouellette, a source state may
impose more stringent discharge limitations upon a point, source
located within its borders than the limitations set by the federal
government.'54 In contrast, an affected state that is subjected to
pollution originating from a source state does not have the ability to
refuse the issuance of an NPDES permit to that source state.' The
only recourse an affected state has is the right of notice by the source
state and ihe right to a hearing held by the agency before the
reissuance of a permit.'56 The Court in Ouellette held that "when a
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); see
also infra pp. 195-96.
150. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Federal Interests in Western
Water Resources: Conflict and Accommodation, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 389, 390 (1989).
151. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
152. See Oullette, 479 U.S. at 487.
153. Id. at 500.
154. Id. at 494; see also 33 U.S.C. §1311(g)(2) (1994).
155. See 33 U.S.C. §1342(b)(5).
156. See id. § 1342(b)(3).
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court considers a state law claim concerning interstate water
pollution that is subject to the CWA, the court must apply the law of
the State in which the point source is located."' 57 The Court also
clearly states that pre-emption was necessary since allowing a suit
based on the law of an affected state was "inconsistent with 'the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."" 58
Although neither the 1997 Convention nor the judgment of the
Danube Dam case were as explicit as the Ouellette Court in limiting
state sovereignty, both the 1997 Convention and the ruling also
recognize that international cooperation necessitates a limitation in a
nation's rights. Article 3 of the 1997 Convention calls for
Watercourse States 59 to enter into "watercourse agreements" that use
the provisions of the 1997 Convention as a framework."6 In cases
where bilateral agreements already exist, the Convention does not
affect the rights or obligations of any party.61 Watercourse States
are obligated to cooperate with each other "on the basis of sovereign
157. Oullette, 479 U.S. at 487. The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the District Court and the Court of Appeals which
adopted the interpretation that a state action involving interstate
water pollution would be maintained under the law of the state in
which the injury occurred. In doing so, it ignored the concerns
expressly laid out in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
158. Oullette, 479 U.S. at 499 n.20 (quoting Hillsborough Court v.
Automated Med. Labs, 471 U.S. 707 (1986)). The holding in this
case was limited to only an affected State's input into the permit
process by Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 100 (1992).
159. 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at art. 2. A Watercourse
State is defined as a "State Party to the Convention in whose
territory part of an international watercourse is situated or a party
that is a regional economic integration organization, in the territory
of one or more of whose Member States part of an international
watercourse is situated." Id.
160. Id. at art. 3, para. 3. "Watercourse States may enter into one
or more agreements, hereinafter referred to as: 'watercourse
agreements,' [sic] which apply and adjust the provisions of the
present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular
international watercourse or part thereof." Id.
161. See id.
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equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order
to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an
international watercourse."' 62  In doing so, the 1997 Convention
encourages the use of joint mechanisms or commissions to aid in
cooperation. 63
Besides the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, under
the 1997 law, nations are also to govern shared watercourses with
the principle of no-harm.' The "No Significant Harm Principle" is
located in Article 7, paragraph 1, which states, "Watercourse States
shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories,
take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other Watercourse States."'65 Because the "No Significant
Harm Principle" inherently adopts the doctrine of prior
appropriation, which protects first time users, and the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilization is more of a balancing approach,
one can argue that these two principles will be inconsistent in their
use. 66 In order to assess whether harm has occurred, the "No
Significant Harm Principle" prescribes nations to account for the
current state of their water, while the principle of equitable and
reasonable use doctrine begins with a clean water source.
The main problem with these two divergent principles is that their
use could result in inequity between developed nations and the
developing nations, who are usually the nations most in need of
162. Id. at art. 8, para. 1.
163. Id. at art. 8, para. 2.
164. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The UN Convention on
International Watercourses: Prospects for an Unfinished Agenda for
Co-Management, available at http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/mak
soud/water98/present7.htm (last visited March 9, 2002); see also
Sharif S. Elmusa, Harmonizing Equitable Utilization and Significant
Harm: Comments on the 1997 ILC Convention, available at
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/maksoud/water98/present7.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2002).
165. 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at art. 7, para. 1.
166. See David J. Lazerwitz, The Flow of International Water
Law: The International Law Commission's Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STuD. 247 (1993), available at http://ijgls.indiana.edu/
archive/01/01/lazerwitz.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
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equal bargaining power.167 The inequity between developed nations
and developing nation is reinforced due to the balancing clause.
Inherent in a balancing clause is the problem of nation/nation
conflict. Because the standard of equitable and reasonable
utilization is a higher standard than that of no significant harm,
nations with different standards may disagree over which standard
governs their own cooperation in international water standards.
Similar to the 1997 convention, the CWA also deals with
state/state conflict. States within the United States that share a
waterway face the same issues as nations that share a waterway.
Upstream states typically have a riparian notion that they can use the
water as they see fit, while the downstream states often get the brunt
of pollution from the upstream state.168 The CWA does not expressly
allow for states to commence civil litigation against each other.
Instead, state governments may proceed with civil action against an
Administrator for failure to enforce an effluent limitation, which
resulted in degradation to public health or which is a violation of that
state's water quality standards. 69 Nevertheless, the United States
judicial system has resolved civil conflicts of transboundary water
pollution.
There was an upstream (Arkansas)/downstream (Oklahoma) state
conflict over shared waterways within the United States in Arkansas
v. Oklahoma.70 Oklahoma has adopted as part of its water quality
standards the federal anti-degradation policy, which prohibits any
further degradation of the water quality.' The anti-degradation
policy is similar to the no significant harm principle.
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the EPA could issue a
permit allowing an Arkansas sewage treatment plant to discharge
effluents into the Illinois River even though the result of such
167. See id.; see also Sherk et al., supra note 4, at 7.2 (arguing that
although the two principles can be read together, in practice, they
will yield different results).
168. See THE SCARCrrY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 36 (for a
discussion of third world examples of upstream/downstream
competition). Population growth and water scarcity are additional
factors that would add to such a potential conflict. Id.
169. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1994).
170. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
171. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 95-96 & nn. 1-2 (1992).
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discharge would violate Oklahoma's water quality standards.' The.
EPA had justified issuing the permit to the plant in Arkansas by
concluding that since the water was already polluted, any added
effluents would not produce a detectable change in the water
quality.'73 Therefore, the water quality standards of Oklahoma were
not violated by the Arkansas discharge. The Court reinforced the
notion that the EPA Administrator has broad discretion in objecting
to or allowing State issuance of a permit or in issuing a permit
itself.74 Justice Stevens repeated the rule that federal law controls
interstate water pollution, concluding that permit decisions are to be
entrusted to the EPA and not settled by the courts. ' The courts
favor the power entrusted to the EPA by Congress.
The 1997 Convention is different in its framework from the CWA
because it provides comprehensive rules for international use and
management of shared waterways. 76 The framework includes ways
for Watercourse States to reach mutual agreements on measures that
protect and preserve an international watercourse from pollution. 77
The Convention has been endorsed by the U.N. General Assembi,
which means that it has more clout in the international community
than the Rules. 7 1 In sum, nations are supposed to work together
instead of leaving decisions to an administrator or to the courts.
One glaring deficiency in the 1997 Convention is an independent
dispute settlement mechanism, like the U.S. court system or the ICJ,
172. Id. at 112.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 105-06.
Congress has vested in the Administrator broad discretion
to establish conditions for NPDES permits ... Similarly,
Congress preserved for the Administrator broad authority
to oversee state permit programs ... The application of
state water quality standards in the interstate context in
wholly consistent with the Act's broad purpose 'to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters.'
Id.
175. See id. at 114.
176. Id.
177. See 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at arts. 20-23.
178. See Chazournes, supra note 164.
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to interpret the 1997 Convention. 79 The 1997 Convention promotes
peaceful settlement of all disputes over the interpretation or
application of the 1997 Convention. 80  However, the 1997
Convention provides for various methods of dispute settlement other
than judicial review. Individuals may use national courts to seek
relief for harm caused by activities relating to the international
watercourse.' If such peaceful settlement cannot be reached,
parties can use other means of arbitration or mediation by a third
party, by any other international watercourse institution, or by the
ICJ.' 82 If these means of arbitration fail, an independent fact-finding
commission comprised of one member-nominated from each party
shall be established to hear evidence and make recommendations,
which parties must then consider in good faith.'83
The 1997 Convention can be seen as a typical "state oriented
instrument," '84 which means that it does not include reference to a
top-down system of global, national, regional and local public
management. This is different from Chapter 18, which does.8 5 In
179. See Lazerwitz, supra note 166.
180. See 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at art. 33, para. 1.
181. Id. at art. 32.
[U]nless the watercourse States concerned have agreed
for the protection of the interests of persons, natural or
juridical, who have suffered or are under a serious threat
of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result of
activities related to an international watercourse, a
watercourse State shall not discriminate on the basis of
nationality or residence or place where the injury
occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with
its legal systems, access to judicial or other procedures, or
a right to claim compensation or other relief in respect of
significant harm caused by such activities carried on in its
territory.
Id.; see also Chazournes, supra note 164.
182. See 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at art. 33, para. 2.
183. Id. at art. 33, paras. 3-9
184. See supra note 143 and accompanying text The premise of
the 1997 Convention is the sovereign right of states to use the water
in their territory as that State sees fit.
185. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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addition, the 1997 Convention considers cooperation of the riparian
states to take place on the national level, through joint commissions,
data exchanges, and notification of planned measures." 6 The 1997
Convention is silent on the preferred dispute settlement mechanism,
but it instead allows states with disputes to choose among various
avenues of arbitration or settlement. 87  Also missing is the
acknowledgement of the variations in economic abilities and social
policy concerns among nations. 8 8 This is different from Chapter 18
of Agenda 21, which was careful to account for the disparity in the
abilities of nations.'89  Despite these inadequacies, the 1997
Convention provides a basic and somewhat comprehensive
framework of principles and guidelines for nations to follow when
adopting measures that protect their internal water quality and
quality of shared watercourses. 9 ' Because the 1997 Convention
occurred so recently, one is unable to determine whether this
framework for protecting transboundary water is successful in and of
itself, or whether it has supplied nations with defenses to the same
problems facing states when they are trying to assert their
sovereignty under the CWA.
C. The Protocol
The recent adoption of a new document may supercede the 1997
Convention and render it moot. The UN/ECE Protocol on Water and
Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes ("Protocol")
was adopted in June 1999 at the Third Ministerial Conference on
Environment and Health. It is the most recent U.N. document that
attempts to establish rules for the management of transboundary
resources. The objective of the Protocol, on both an international
and national level, is the protection of human health through water
186. See 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at arts. 3, 9, 12.
187. Id. at art. 33 (discussing the Dispute Settlement Procedures of
the 1997 Convention); see also Final Act, supra, note 61.
188. See Lazerwitz, supra note 166 (discussing the need for
assistance for developing countries in particular).
189. See Agenda 21, supra note 49, at ch. 18.6.
190. See 1997 Convention, supra note 142, at arts. 35-36
(discussing Ratification and Entry into Force).
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management.' The Protocol states that nation parties should take
all appropriate measures to ensure an adequate supply of drinking
water, 92 sanitation,'93 safeguards against water-related disease'94 and
191. UN/ECE Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 24, 1999, at art. 1, U.N.
Doc. MP.WAT/AC.1/1991/1 (1999), available at http://www.inter
nationalwaterlaw.org/RegionalDocs/UNECEProtocol.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Protocol on Water and Health].
The objective of this Protocol is to promote at all
appropriate levels, nationally as well as in transboundary
and international contexts, the protection of human health
and well-being, both individual and collective, within a
framework of sustainable development, through
improving water management, including the protection of
water ecosystems, and through preventing, controlling
and reducing water-related diseases.
Id.
192. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(a). "The Parties shall, in particular, take
all appropriate measures for the purpose of ensuring: (a) Adequate
supplies of wholesome drinking water which is free from any micro-
organisms, parasites and substances which, owing to their numbers
or concentration, constitute a potential danger to human health." Id.
193. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(b). "The Parties shall, in particular, take
all appropriate measures for the purpose of ensuring: (b) Adequate
sanitation of a standard which sufficiently protects human health and
the environment. This shall in particular be done through the
establishment, improvement and maintenance of collective systems."
Id.
194. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(d).
The Parties shall, in particular, take all appropriate
measures for the purpose of ensuring: (d) Sufficient
safeguards for human health against water-related disease
arising from the use of water for recreational purposes,
from the use of water for aquaculture, from the water in
which shellfish are produced or from which they are
harvested, from the use of waste water for irrigation or
from the use of sewage sludge in agriculture or
aquaculture.
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the protection of water resources used for drinking water.'95 It also
mandates national action to create a stable legal and administrative
framework for both private and public sector clean water
initiatives 96 and also requires public authorities to take account of
any action by any individual has an impact on public health.'97
Most importantly, the Protocol allows parties to implement more
stringent measures than statutorily required 98 and does not preempt
any rights or obligations existing under the 1997 Convention or any
international agreement, "except where the requirements under this
Protocol are more stringent than the corresponding requirements
under the Convention or than other existing international
agreement."9 9 Thus measures set forth in the 1997 Convention,
which are not as stringent as the Protocol measures, would be pre-
empted. Specifically, the Protocol dictates the precautionary
principle2 0 and the polluter-pays principle2"' as the guiding
Id.
195. Id. at art. 4, para. 2(c). "The Parties shall, in particular, take
all appropriate measures for the purpose of ensuring: (c) Effective
protection of water resources used as sources of drinking water, and
their related water ecosystems, from pollution from other causes,
including agriculture, industry and other discharges and emissions of
hazardous substances." Id.
196. Id. at art. 4, para. 5 'The Parties shall take all appropriate
action to create legal, administrative and economic frameworks
which are stable and enabling and within which the public, private
and voluntary sectors can each make its contribution to improving
water management for the purpose of preventing, controlling and
reducing water-related disease." Id.
197. Protocol on Water and Health, supra note 191, at art. 4, para.
6. 'The Parties shall require public authorities which are
considering taking action, or approving the taking by others of
action, that may have a significant impact on the environment of any
waters within the scope of this Protocol to take due account of any
potential impact of that action on public health." Id.
198. Id. at art. 4, para. 8. 'The provisions of this Protocol shall not
affect the rights of Parties to maintain, adopt or implement more
stringent measures than those set down in this Protocol." Id.
199. Id. at art. 4, para. 9 (emphasis added).
200. See id. at art. 5(a).
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customary principles for nations when implementing measures
relating to water safety.20 2 The Precautionary Principle basically
says that measures to prevent harm should be taken before scientific
evidence has confirmed a causal effect. The Polluter-Pays Principle
states that any costs for prevention or clean up should be undertaken,
at any time, by the polluter. The Protocol also mentions that the
World Health Organization's Guidelines are the target for drinking
water quality.2 3
The Protocol is a binding set of obligations24 for nations who
ratify the document.2 5 Once the Protocol is entered into force,20 6 the
Parties must hold meetings,2 7 agree to the dispute settlement
mechanism of the Convention, 20 8 and cooperate with each other in
the implementation of local and national measures under the
Protocol.29 The specific objective, with clear target standards and
timeframes, makes this document easier to implement on a national
or international level than Agenda 21 .2" The Protocol still allows
nations the sovereign right to exploit their own resources, so long as
201. See id. at art. 5(b).
202. See id. at art. 5(a)-(b).
203. Protocol on Water and Health, supra note 191, at art. 6, para.
2(a).
204. See id. at art. 22 (providing provisions for full ratification,
acceptance, approval and accession, as well as the limitation for
regional economic integration).
205. Id.
206. See id. at art. 23.
207. See id. at art. 16.
208. See id. at art. 20.
209. Protocol on Water and Health, supra note 191, at arts. 11(b),
14 (for the Protocol on Water and Health's obligations on
international cooperation and assistance in assessing, establishing
and executing plans for improving water quality and sanitation under
it).
210. Since this Protocol on Water and Health was not adopted until
June of 1999, there are no statistics as to whether implementation of
it has, on the whole, been more successful than the implementation
of Agenda 21.
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such activities do not cause damage to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.1
IV. THE ROLE OF A PROPOSED AND OF AN EXISTING
JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
Because there have been so many measures which deal specifically
with the protection of water, either on a national or international
context, 12 and because rules of customary international law, such as
the Vienna Convention, 3 also have to be taken into consideration,
knowing which guidelines and principles to follow is daunting.
Parties to the 1997 Convention may be parties to the Protocol and to
other U.N. Organizations in addition to the WTO. 24  Further,
complications arise because most nations that share waterways have
had some form of bilateral agreement in place for years.2 5 No
international agreement exists that supercedes or changes the
211. This sovereign right is acknowledged in art. 5(c) as being in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In the ever-
increasing global world, almost any abuse of water supply would
have a negative effect outside the jurisdiction of the abusing State.
And, if the right to a clean supply of water is a fundamental right,
then this fundamental right directly conflicts with this sovereign
right. See, e.g., Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, in 1(5)
WATER PoLICY 487 (1999).
212. This Note covers the Helsinki Rules, the Rio Declaration,
Agenda 21, Chapter 18, the WTO, the 1997 Convention, and the
Protocol on Water and Health. Although these are the major bodies,
which deal specifically with transboundary water, there may be other
conventions, which deal indirectly with clean water issues, such as
the documents of the WHO.
213. Although the ICJ does not rule on the applicability of the
Vienna Convention to the Danube Dam Case, it does acknowledge
that rules laid down in the Convention "might be considered as a
codification of existing customary law." Gabfkovo-Nagymaros
Project, supra note 10.
214. See THE SCARCITY OF WATER, supra note 1.
215. See generally Hamner & Wolf, supra note 22.
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obligations of a bilateral agreement, except for the Protocol. 2 6 Yet
the ICJ in the Danube Dam Case stated that changes in international
environmental norms and standards should be taken account of by
nations party to such an agreement.217
It seems likely that one of the bodies of the U.N., such as the
International Law Commission, could take on the role of manager of
the world's transboundary water resources if it wanted to do so. The
ICJ also is available as a forum in which nations could resolve cases
of transboundary water disputes. However, evidenced by comparing
the new activity in the realm created by the 1997 Convention and the
Protocol to the CWA, it is possible to learn from the mistakes of
others. 218 Like the CWA, any international commission or act must
be binding on all States and must establish minimum standards on
water quality as well as overriding principles and protocols. 219 In
addition, a commission must be willing to work with nations to
enable them to set their own standards and policies, contained within
the framework of an international document. To head this
commission, there must be an administrator with authority to settle
disputes. Otherwise, concepts such as equitable and reasonable
utilization remain as soft law, without being actualized in national
law.220 However, all of this will fail anyway if nations states are
unwilling to implement the international standards.
216. The standard language on the multilateral agreements
discussed herein, is that of the 1997 Convention, "nothing in the
present Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a
watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date
on which it became a party to the present Convention." 1997
Convention, supra note 142, at art. 3.
217. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 436-38.
218. This has already been suggested for the North American
management of its transboundary waters. See MacDonnell, supra
note 150.
219. See id. The article does not recommend detailed specification
to set up such an institution, but it does give general requirements
that the institution should follow.
220. It is most important that clean up of Water is a national
priority for the States. Getting the NGOs (non-governmental
organizations) and the local community involved would be
impossible without national support. In addition, every waterway
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CONCLUSION
Much of international environmental law is contradictory. Clean
water is a fundamental human right22 ' but nations have the sovereign
right to pollute their water. Global cooperation is essential for
transboundary water management, 2 3 but there exists only one
binding international agreement that enforces minimum measures
stricter than the bilateral agreements for which nations have
negotiated.2  The guiding customary principles that guide
international water law are inherently contradictory. Equitable and
reasonable utilization of resources and first in time or prior
appropriation are the opposite of each other. 25 However, as fresh
water is becoming increasingly scarce, 26 and as water resources are
not used efficiently 27 and most national policy favors economic
growth,22 ' billions of people are left without a sufficient amount of
clean water.229
The international community has tried to solve the problem. 20
Yet, without the will to put global environmental needs over
and every State is different. States must be allowed to manage in a
way that respects their right to govern, while adhering to
international standards for water quality and quantity.
221 See generally Gleick, supra note 211.
222. Id.
223. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 432.
224. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the Protocol and
its exception for more stringent measures).
225. See THE SCARCITY OF WATER, supra note 1.
226. See Graffy, supra note 112, at 402-03.
227. Id. at 403.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 404. Two billion people lack access to clean water and
an additional billion lack safe sanitation systems. Id.
230. See THE SCARCITY OF WATER, supra note 1, at 49. Although
it was not the first international response, the United Nations Water
Conference, held in Mar del Plata in 1977 produced the first action
plan for nations to implement its principles and follow its guidelines
in implementing measures. Id.
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sovereignty, the international community has simply been building
ineffectively upon the same principles for at least thirty years.3
If an international organization is willing to adopt some of the
strengths of the CWA, such as identifying problems establishing
abatement measures and seeking compliance, the existing
international clean water documents could be overhauled. Nations
could set their own restrictions, limitations and standards, as long as
they meet the minimums set by the international organization.
Member nations to the organization would be bound by the policies
and processes set forth by the organization. An international court,
such as the ICJ, would be essential for arbitrating disputes among
member natiobs. The international community should continue to
learn from the United States model and improve upon it. It needs to,
for the lives and livelihoods of billions are at stake.
231. For example, the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Water of
International Rivers, August 1966, from which all other water
resources documents are based, was implemented in 1966.
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